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The World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) has reawakened old arguments over the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system 
on public access to essential medicines. As used here, essential medicines are those needed in 
symptom management, palliative care, and in the treatment of infections, such as human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), malaria, tuberculosis, and sleeping sickness in places like sub-Saharan 
Africa. Some argue that patents will further inhibit access to these medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Others, however, argue the opposite. The latter maintain that patent protection under TRIPS can 
promote the growth of the pharmaceutical industry in places like sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, they 
assert that pharmaceutical patents are not responsible for the limited access to essential medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, they trace the problem of access to non-patent factors, such as poverty, 
the lack of supportive infrastructure, and poor governance. This paper set out to assess these 
contrasting arguments, with a view to determining the actual impact that pharmaceutical patents may 
be having on access to essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. Keyword search of electronic 
databases was conducted, in addition to a review of relevant literature from print sources. A manual 
analysis then followed. It was found that, rather than a single set of factors, both patent and non-
patent factors combine to inhibit access to essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. It is imperative 
for sub-Saharan African countries to review current tariff and taxation policies, take steps to improve 
the supply of vital infrastructure, and strengthen their overall healthcare systems. They should also 
ensure that their IP systems are supportive of public healthcare needs. Equally important, is that 
TRIPS and the IP system should be more supportive of sub-Saharan Africa’s struggle to bear its 
disease burden, rather than focusing narrowly on profit maximisation for pharmaceutical companies. 
Sub-Saharan Africa also needs increased international financing, private-public collaboration in 
research, and the sharing of benefits in order to cater effectively for the health needs of its citizens. 
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The impact of patents on the availability of essential 
medicines to poor people in places like sub-Saharan 
Africa has been the subject of protracted disagreements. 
Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS), which became effective on January 1st 1995, 
have intensified such disagreements. TRIPS requires all 
world trade organization (WTO) members to strengthen 
their intellectual property (IP) protection systems, and for 
those that do not already provide for IP protection in their 
domestic legislation to do so. Those opposed to TRIPS 
fear that the intensification of IP protection and in 
particular, patents, will exacerbate the problem of access 
to essential medicines in places like sub-Saharan Africa. 





the problem of access to non-patent factors. This latter 
group stresses that patents have, in fact, the potential to 
help developing countries, including those in sub-
Saharan Africa, build their own pharmaceutical industry. 
This paper argues that both patent and non-patent 
factors are responsible for the problem of access to 
essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. It explains 
how this is so, and suggests useful measures for 
addressing the problem. 
 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE TRIPS 
 
Intellectual property (IP)  
 
IP refers to creations of the mind, that is, intellectual 
creations, such as literary and artistic works, inventions 
and more. In order to encourage the continuous and 
beneficial enrichment of society with such creations, 
governments grant specific rights to their creators. Those 
rights are called intellectual property rights (IPRs), and 
entitle the holders to prevent others from misappro-
priating their creation for a specified period of time. Two 
main categories of IP exist: industry property and artistic 
and literary property. Until fairly recently, these were 
respectively governed by the Paris Convention (1883) 
and the Berne Convention (1896). Both Conventions, 
which have been revised several times, are administered 
by the Geneva-based World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO). 
Of immediate relevance to this paper is industrial pro-
perty, and specifically, that specie known as patent. A 
patent is an IPR granted to protect an invention. An 
invention is any product, process, or improvement 
thereof, which is new, not obvious to an ordinarily skilled 
person in the relevant field, and is useful to society 
(TRIPS Article 27). Through a patent, an inventor is able 
to control, for a limited period of time, who is able to use 





The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, led to the birth of the WTO, with the 
signing of the Marrakesh Agreement on April 15, 1994. 
Part of the Agreement, Annex IC, is TRIPS. All WTO 
Members are automatically signatories to, and are bound  
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by TRIPS, which is administered by the TRIPS Council 
based in Geneva. Members are expected to comply with 
the TRIPS provisions, subject to certain exceptions, and 
some measure of appreciation in the mode of 
implementation. At present, TRIPS serves as a global 
reference point for WTO Members in the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs at national levels. 
In the period before TRIPS, there were divergences 
among countries in the protection of IPRs. While effective 
protection was provided in developed countries, such as 
the U.S. (Lockwood, 2009), in many other countries, pro-
tection was either absent, or enforcement was lukewarm 
(Karapinar and Temmerman, 2008). As it was considered 
that this imbalance would work against the interests of 
the predominantly IP exporting developed countries, 
especially the U.S. (Kirchanski, 1994), developed coun-
tries, spearheaded by the U.S., fought frantically and 
succeeded in inserting TRIPS into the Marrakesh 
Agreement (Mellino, 2010). Article 7 of TRIPS provides 
for the effective protection and enforcement of IPRs 
globally, with a viewing to facilitating technological 
innovation and the diffusion of technology. 
To some observers (Lucyk, 2006; Goodwin, 2008; 
Mellino, 2010), the real objective of TRIPS, thus, was to 
promote the global protection and enforcement of IPRs. 
That may, in fact, be true. But, as will be explained, a 
purposeful look at Articles 7, read conjointly with other 
relevant provisions, such as Article 8, 30 and 73, and 
based on the analyses of TRIPS provided by sources, 
such as the Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 
2001, as well as the August 2003 Decision of the TRIPS 
Council, the objective of TRIPS extends well beyond the 
protection of IPRs. In fact, as it has been correctly 
described, TRIPS is only a means to an end (Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Research Institute, 2000). 
Presently, most sub-Saharan African countries are WTO 
Members and are, therefore, bound by TRIPS, although, 
as indicated below, compliance in terms of the protection 
of pharmaceutical patents has been deferred for sub-
Saharan African countries recognised as least developing 
countries (LDCs). 
Article 27 (1) of TRIPS requires all members to extend 
patent protection to any invention in all fields of techno-
logy, and for a minimum period of twenty years (Article 
33). These provisions cover pharmaceutical patents, 
which give the holders internationally recognisable 
exclusive rights to produce, use, sell and import patented 
medicines (Article 28). These are significant new 
developments. The Paris Convention did not require the 
extension of patents to any area of technology, neither did it 
mandate the grant of exclusive patents, nor specify a 
minimum duration for such rights (International 
Intellectual Property Institute, 2000). 
Thus, several countries, such as India, hitherto 
excluded pharmaceuticals from protection (Barton, 2004). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, Angola, Ghana and Malawi did not 
grant patents for pharmaceutical products before the 
advent   of   TRIPS   (International   Intellectual  Property  




Institute, 2000). Even those countries that granted 
patents did so for a comparatively shorter duration. 
Examples are Thailand where patents lasted for just 
three years. South Africa allowed only sixteen years 
(Williams, 2001). 
Furthermore, Article 31(f) qualifies the circumstances 
under which Members may use compulsory licensing; a 
process that allows Members to “break” a patent by 
authorizing a third party to manufacture a patented drug, 
without the consent of the patent holder. All WTO 
members are subject to these rules. Developed countries 
were allowed until January 1, 1996 to bring their domestic 
IP laws into conformity with TRIPS, while developing 
countries were given until January 1, 2000 to do so 
(Article 65). The LDCs were given until January 1, 2006 
to comply (Article 66(1)). Developing countries that did 
not hitherto grant patents in required areas such as 
pharmaceuticals as of January 1, 1995 were given an 
additional transition period of 5 years, that is, until 
January 1, 2005 to provide for protection (Article 65(4)). 
However, they were immediately obliged to start 
receiving patent applications through the establishment of 
a “mail box” system as provided for under Article 
70(80(c). Due to their peculiar circumstances, the Doha 
Declaration (Paragraph 7) extended the deadline for 
LDCs to provide for pharmaceutical patents in their 
domestic laws to January 1, 2016, with the possibility of 
further extensions. 
Compliance with the TRIPS provisions is compulsory 
for all WTO Members, and is a condition for membership 
of the organization. This obligation is not to be viewed 
lightly because non-compliance is sanctionable. An erring 
Member could be summoned by any other aggrieved 
Member before a WTO dispute panel under the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU); a mechanism 
established to resolve IP and other trade disputes 
between WTO Members. If a complaint is upheld, the 
WTO could authorize an aggrieved Member to adopt 
retaliatory trade measures against an erring Member, 
which could have serious negative consequences on the 
latter’s domestic economy. An erring member could also 
suffer negative international publicity, and be perceived 




REVIEW OF THE DEBATE ON PHARMACEUTICAL 
PATENTS 
 
As noted, the impact of increased IP protection on public 
access to essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa has 
been fiercely debated. Do pharmaceutical patents inhibit 
access to essential medicines in that region of the world? 
Or is the lack of access traceable to non-patent factors? 
Both critics and supporters of the patent system, 
apparently agree that a range of non-patent factors 





that has been identified is the lack of effective political 
leadership that correctly identifies domestic healthcare 
needs (Donald, 1999; Attaran and Gillespie-White, 2001). 
Another factor is the inability of some governments in 
developing countries to shape negotiations at 
international trade fora, such as the WTO (Donald, 1999). 
In addition, many developing countries, including those in 
sub-Saharan Africa, lack effective economic systems, the 
technical skills necessary to operate complex medical 
equipment, and the spare parts needed to sustain such 
equipment (Donald, 1999). 
In addition, the problem of access is blamed on high 
prices (Dutfield, 2008). This is coupled by the low 
purchasing power of sub-Saharan Africans, which makes 
local markets unattractive to potential producers and 
suppliers of essential medicines (Attaran and Gillespie-
White, 2001). Poor infrastructure (Dutfield, 2008) and 
inefficient competition policies that make it difficult for 
rival pharmaceutical products to enter the market, as well 
as high import tariffs and sales taxes are also cited to as 
factors limiting access to essential medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa (Attaran and Gillespie-White, 2001). 
Other factors include debt burden (International Intellec-
tual Property Institute, 2000), the absence of personnel 
who are trained in the use and dissemination of essential 
medicines in local communities (Kessel and Chatto-
padhy, 1999; Dutfield, 2008), and the distant location of 
the few available medical facilities (Mellino, 2010). 
Despite the broad consensus on the role of non-patent 
factors in inhibiting access to essential medicines in 
places like sub-Saharan Africa, views get polarised when 
it comes to ascertaining what role pharmaceutical patents 
play in that regard. For example, Donald (1999) argues 
that, apart from non-patent factors, the broadening and 
intensification of IP protection under TRIPS, and parti-
cularly patents, would place further limitation on access 
to essential medicines in poor countries like those in sub-
Saharan Africa. Specifically, it would prevent competition, 
especially from generics, stifle innovation, and intensify 
the misappropriation of the genetic resources of indi-
genous communities. This would result in an overall 
increase in the prices of pharmaceutical products.  These 
views are shared by Williams (2001) who argues, in addi-
tion, that the vagueness of some TRIPS provisions, for 
instance, Article 31 (to be discussed), and the uncer-
tainty stemming from this, would expose poor countries to 
expensive litigation and dispute settlement procedures, 
which could delay treatment and further divert their 
meagre resources away from pressing healthcare needs. 
But presenting the flip side to the debate are those 
who argue, equally strongly, that pharmaceutical patents 
do not really deny people in poor countries access to 
essential medicines. For example, the former Chairman 
of GlaxoSmithKline, Sir Richard Sykes (2002), insists that 
pharmaceutical patents do not prevent developing coun-
tries from accessing the medicines they need. Instead, 





have the necessary technological capacity to establish 
their own pharmaceutical industry. Proponents of this 
view also maintain that patents are not usually sought in 
small and technologically-disadvantaged developing 
countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. Even 
when patents are sought, they do not affect costs or 
access. 
A study on patenting trends in antiretroviral (ARV) 
medicines in 53 African countries, which was conducted 
between October, 2000 and March, 2001, seemly 
validate the claim that patents are not the cause of the 
problem of access. That study (Attaran and Gillespie-
White, 2001), examined how many patents existed in 53 
African countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
for 15 ARVs belonging to eight pharmaceutical patent 
holders. It was found that most of the ARVs were patent-
ed in only a few African countries. The only exception 
was South Africa, where there were patents for 13 out of 
the 15 ARVs. 
Another study on the same issue by the International 
Intellectual Property Institute (2000) similarly concluded 
that the problem of access is not caused by pharma-
ceutical patents. The study concluded that the major 
factor inhibiting access was inadequate government and 
private sector finances, essential to the proper func-
tioning of the general healthcare system. This analytical 
stalemate on the impact of pharmaceutical patents on 
access to essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa 
provides the impetus for the present paper. The objective 
is to carefully assess these contrasting arguments, in 
order to foster a clearer understanding of the complex 
interaction between both phenomena, and identify 
specific steps that need to be taken at both national and 
international levels based on such insight. 
 
 
ANALYSING THE ARGUMENTS 
 
The role of non-patent factors 
 
It is appropriate to acknowledge that a myriad of factors 
unrelated to the IP system, play a crucial role in 
determining access to essential medicines in places like 
sub-Saharan Africa (Anna, 1999; Attaran and Lee, 2001). 
Also, it is useful, for the purposes of completeness, to 
develop, in slightly greater detail, some of the more 
important initial impressions given by the above authors 
on those factors. However, one important non-patent 
factor militating against access to essential medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa not mentioned by the authors must 
first be noted. This relates to the often misleading social 
beliefs held in some parts of that region. For instance, 
South Africa, which accounts for the highest level of 
HIV/AIDS cases on the continent. Long after the onset of 
the pandemic in that country, its former President, Thabo 
Mbeki, repeatedly denied the link between HIV and AIDS, 
until mounting international pressure forced him to rethink  




his position. Manito Tshabalala, who was Health Minister 
at the time, also described ARVs as dangerous and 
advocated beetroot, lemons, garlic and African potatoes 
as a cure for AIDS (Shah, 2009). Tshabalala apparently 
supported one Mathias Rath, a vitamin dealer, who 
vigorously campaigned against ARVs, condemning them 
as poisonous. Rath claimed that the use of multivitamins 
decreased the risk of HIV by 50%, purportedly relying on 
a study by Harvard School of Public Health researchers, 
which he had interpreted incorrectly (Shah, 2009). 
The Harvard study suggested that the number of 
patients on vitamins who were seriously ill or dead (25%) 
was lower than those on placebo (31%). But, while this 
result suggests that the use of vitamins may slow down 
the development of HIV into AIDS, it in no way 
undermines the visibly positive effect of ARVs. In fact, the 
Harvard researchers were so alarmed by Rath 
misinterpretation of their findings that they issued a 
rejoinder denouncing him and acknowledging the 
importance of medication (Shah, 2009). This account 
spectacularly illustrates how social or cultural beliefs and 
taboos could deny or delay access to essential medicines 
to those who need them in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Partly evident from the above, is the lack of political 
will, which contributes to the denial of access to essential 
medicines (Donald, 1999). The failure of political leader-
ship is typical of much of Africa. The result of this is the 
absence of decisive actions to identify and champion 
public healthcare needs. There are, however, a few 
instructive exceptions. In Senegal, for example, the 
existence of strong political will was instrumental to the 
early identification of the HIV/AIDS problem; the mobile-
sation of financial resources, the use of mass media to 
countervail cultural and religious taboos, the promotion of 
the use of condom, and the provision of universal access 
to ARV treatment. The enviable outcome was that at the 
end of the 1990s, Senegal recorded one of the lowest rates 
of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 1999). 
But there are other factors, which may impede access 
to essential medicines that are beyond the control of 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in that 
region of the world are entrapped in an international 
political-economic structure that controls the flow of vital 
goods and services, including the costs at which they 
may be accessed. They have so far not been able to 
influence that structure in any significant manner. The 
circumstances surrounding their ascension into the WTO, 
exemplifies the vulnerable situation in which sub-Saharan 
African countries find themselves. 
Developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan 
Africa, accepted the WTO agreements, including TRIPS, 
not because they were genuinely convinced about their 
benefits. Instead, it was because they faced the unwell-
come alternative of being denied access to the lucrative 
Western market for agriculture and textiles that was 
promised in return for their acceptance of the agree-
ments, these  promise  remains  essentially  unfulfilled  to  




date (Gerhart, 2000). For sub-Saharan African countries, 
this weak position means that the availability and costs of 
essential pharmaceutical products are unfavourable to 
universal access. 
Owing to a combination of poor leadership and a 
lopsided international political-economic structure, people 
in sub-Saharan Africa have persistently contended with 
poverty, which limits their ability to afford even the barest 
essential healthcare needs (Simms et al., 2001; Bird and 
Cahoy, 2008). For example, 28 of 48 African countries 
had an average per capita income of less than $1 per day 
in 1999 compared to 19 of 36 countries in 1981 (UNICEF, 
2001). In addition, most sub-Saharan African countries 
spend less than an average of US$ 10 per person per 
year on healthcare, which is 20 to 40% below the World 
Bank’s advocated minimum level of healthcare services 
(Simms et al., 2001; Sanders, 2009). 
But the IMF and the World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes that were imposed on African governments 
in the 1980s increased the level of poverty on the 
continent and further limited the ability of people to obtain 
essential medicines. This exposed them helplessly to 
deadly diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria (Medact and World Development Movement, 
1999). In the 1960s and 1970s, many African countries 
made major improvements in their healthcare systems, 
which had neglected the interest of a sound majority of 
the people during the colonial era (Breman and Shelton, 
2001). Primary healthcare was extended to a lot more 
people. However, all this unraveled as a result of the 
economic crises of the 1980s, many African countries 
were forced to seek assistance from the IMF and the 
World Bank. Both institutions subjected them to harsh 
loan “conditionalities” and destructive structural adjust-
ment programmes (Breman and Shelton, 2001). 
By 1997, sub-Saharan African countries were already 
remitting to Western creditors more than four times the 
amount invested in their domestic healthcare systems. In 
1998, Senegal alone reportedly spent more than five 
times the amount spent on health in loan repayments 
(Colgan, 2002). As of 2000, Africa’s total debt was US 
$230 billion, with annual repayments of US 15 billion, 
amounting to approximately 5% of its income (Interna-
tional intellectual Property Institute, 2000). This financial 
squeeze disrupted African healthcare systems, and made 
people increasingly vulnerable to diseases. The situation 
worsened with the privatisation of healthcare advocated 
by the World Bank, which led to the commercialisation of 
health services, thus denying ever more people access to 
essential healthcare (Colgan, 2002). 
The recent global financial crisis did not help matters 
either, as it forced governments to cut down on their 
already meagre health budgets, despite the spate of 
infection from major diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis, malaria and sleeping sickness. The global 
financial crisis also undermined the activities of interna-





TB and Malaria reported a US$ 4 billion shortfall in what it 
needed to sustain the funding of essential services for 
these illnesses in 2010. That was in addition to a US$ 
10.7 billion funding deficit for the execution of the Global 
Plan to Stop TB at regional levels (Colgan, 2002). 
Another factor impeding access to essential medicines 
in sub-Saharan Africa is poor international media 
coverage of diseases that more commonly afflict people 
in that region. In the 1990s, HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan 
Africa gained international limelight only when it became 
perceived as a threat to U.S. national security (Gellman, 
2000). But as fears dissipated in the U.S. and other parts 
of the Western world, media attention correspondingly 
waned. The absence of international media coverage 
could prevent or delay the mobilisation of the resources 
needed to ensure a timely and steady stream of 
medicines to help sick people in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Gellman, 2000). 
Finally, the “brain drain” of qualified medical personnel 
from sub-Saharan Africa to overseas countries (Novak, 
2003; Coombes, 2005), the lack of effective infrastructure 
and healthcare delivery systems (Attaran and Gillespie-
White, 2001), and high import tariffs (Médecins Sans 
Frontières and Health Action International, 2000), which, 
in some cases, could be as high as 30% (International 
Intellectual Property Institute, 2000) all contribute to the 
problem of access to essential medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Unarguably, therefore, non-patent factors play a role in 
denying access to essential medicines in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In other words, even amid the absence of phar-
maceutical patents, many people in sub-Saharan Africa 
may still not gain access to essential medicines due to a 
combination of non-patent factors, as discussed above. 
But, as will be shown below, this does not mean that 
pharmaceutical patents have no impact at all on access 
to essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
 
The role of pharmaceutical patents  
 
Before examining the role pharmaceutical patents play in 
determining access to essential medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa, the philosophical justification for the 
patent system is worth considering. The often given 
rationale of the patent system is rooted in the Lockean 
idea that a person who labours upon resources that are 
either unowned or “held in common” has a natural 
property right to the fruits of his or her labour, and that 
the State has a duty to respect and enforce that right 
(Hughes,1998; Laslett, 1970). In Anarchy, State and 
Utopia, Robert (Nozick, 1974) identifies with this Lockean 
perspective. But Locke also points out that the acquisition 
of property right is legitimate only if after such acquisition, 
there are still enough common good left for others. 
Nozick explains that correctly read, this proviso means 





others are not thereby hurt or left in a condition worse 
than would have existed if the State did not grant that 
right (Nozick, 1974). 
Nozick (1974) reported the grant of a patent does not 
breach the Lockean proviso because, although public 
access to the invention is necessarily restricted, it would 
not have existed in the first place without the investor’s 
effort. In other words, the patent benefits, rather than 
harms the public. Thus, the grant of a patent is doubly 
important both as a reward for the inventor’s labour, and 
as an incentive for more inventions that are beneficial to 
the public. This exposition helps to explain the objectives 
that underpin pharmaceutical patents. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, R and D costs are high, 
just as is the risk of failure (Angell, 2004; Dutfield, 2008). 
Without patents, inventors may find it challenging to 
recoup their costs and generate profit (Angell, 2004). And 
they are unlikely to be motivated to research into more 
new medicines (Bird and Cahoy, 2008). This result would 
be detrimental to society as a whole. Thus, the monopoly 
rights embedded in patents enable pharmaceutical 
companies to recover research costs and post profit. 
Thus, it is believed that patenting would encourage them 
to embark on further research, in order to produce new 
medicines for the benefit of society (Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights Report, 2002; Lockwood, 
2009). 
Nevertheless, it remains an important question 
whether, given their small markets and weak purchasing 
power, pharmaceutical patents do incentivize research 
into medicines for the treatment of diseases that are 
prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The evidence suggests 
otherwise. It has been estimated that on average, 
pharmaceutical companies require a minimum guaran-
teed profit of about $I billion to induce them to assume 
the risk of researching into any particular disease 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002). As such, pharmaceutical patents provide only a 
limited incentive for pharmaceutical companies to 
research into diseases associated with people in 
developing parts of the world, especially sub Saharan 
Africa, given their low purchasing power (Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights Report, 2002; Dutfield, 2008). 
As an illustration, the amount of global research spending 
devoted to diseases affecting the developing world is 
under 5% (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
Report, 2002). 
And out of the 1393 medicines approved from 1975 to 
1999, only 13 related to diseases that also affect sub-
Saharan Africa (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights Report, 2002). Also, there is hardly any research 
on malaria, TB and sleeping sickness (Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights Report, 2002). On the other 
hand, as of 2002 in the U.S. alone, there were 64 
approved medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, and 
103 in progress, because this disease equally affects the 
developed world (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights Report, 2002). 




A study conducted in 2005, ten years after TRIPS, 
found that the level of research on diseases affecting 
people in poor parts of the world remained largely low in 
relation to the overall level of pharmaceutical research 
(Lanjouw, 2005). For example, the amount of research 
money committed to those diseases fell from 16% in 
1998 to 10%, with more emphasis being placed on global 
products for the European and American markets. The 
study also found that, in certain cases, pharmaceutical 
companies were reluctant to introduce new medicines in 
low and middle income countries because it was not 
lucrative to do so due to their weak purchasing power. 
Although, there has been an increase in innovative 
activities on tropical diseases in recent years, the major 
diseases plaguing sub-Saharan African countries are still 
generally neglected (Council on Health Research for 
Development and New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development, 2009). 
Moreover, if patents are meant to induce new 
research, then the fact that only few patents are claimed 
in sub-Saharan Africa, as Attaran and Gillespie-White 
(2001) suggested that there is no reason to expect new 
research into diseases that commonly affect people in 
this part of the world. Since, their study took place in 
2000/2001, it is not clear to what extent that their study 
correctly depicts the situation well after the implemen-
tation of TRIPS. A new study, as discussed below, is 
evidently required to demonstrate current patenting 
trends in ARVs in sub-Saharan Africa. In any case, as 
both authors acknowledge, their findings do not 
conclusively resolve the core question of whether 
pharmaceutical patents do inhibit access to essential 
medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, they stress that 
it would be wrong to interpret their findings, suggesting 
that pharmaceutical patents never impede access to 
essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001) study was 
reviewed fairly recently. Deiss (2007) examined develop-
ments in pharmaceutical patenting since Attaran and 
Gillespie-White published their findings. Deiss found a 
significantly higher number of patents in sub-Saharan 
African countries that are either members of ARIPO or 
OAPI, compared to those that do not belong to any of 
these organisations. ARIPO (African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organisation) is an African regional intellectual 
property protection organisation, which has mainly 
English-speaking members. OAPI (Organisation Africaine 
de la Propriété Intellectuelle ) is the French equivalent, 
with mainly French-speaking members. Most of the 
members of these organisations also belong to the WTO. 
Deiss’ study found that there was a positive relationship 
between HIV infection levels and the number of existing 
patents, which is explained by membership in an 
intellectual property organization, ARIPO or OAPI. Also, the 
average number of patents in ARIPO countries (6.4), as well 
as in OAPI countries (3.5), was higher than the average 
number (1.1 to 1.7) in sub-Saharan African countries that 
did not belong to any of those organisations. These  new- 




er findings place a caveat against those of the Attaran 
and Gillespie-White study. 
But, even if collectively, patenting rates were still to be 
low in sub-Saharan Africa, why this is so, warrants some 
curiosity. While such a scenario might suggest altruism on 
the part of pharmaceutical companies, it could, 
alternatively and more tenably, be construed as the result 
of shrewd economics (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Report, 2002). Since sub-Saharan Africa 
has a weak technological capacity, the risk of patent 
infringement is potentially low. Moreover, given that 
markets are small, companies might consider patenting 
imprudent, in view of the high cost of patent acquisition and 
enforcement (Attaran and Gillespie-White, 2001). 
Based on this logic, it is unsurprising that the only sub-
Saharan African country where patenting was very high, 
based on Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001), was South 
Africa, which has the highest rate of Africa’s HIV cases. 
There, 13 of the available 15 ARVs were under patent. 
The inescapable explanation for the high patenting rate is 
that South Africa has a bigger and more profitable market. 
Moreover, it has a higher technological capacity and, 
therefore, presents a higher level of infringement risk 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002). The protracted legal challenge mounted against 
South Africa’s attempt to procure cheap HIV/AIDS 
medicines in the late 1990s, lends further credence to 
this alternative interpretation. In 1997, former President 
Nelson Mandela signed the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90. This was 
meant to boost the availability of cheap HIV/AIDS 
medicines through compulsory licensing and parallel 
importation of medicines that were then under patent in 
the country. 
Undoubtedly, HIV/AIDS is of national emergency, and, 
as will become clearer later on, the adopted measures 
were TRIPS-compatible. Despite this, the South African 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association, including 
international pharmaceutical companies from Europe and 
America, sued the South African Government. They 
alleged that the 1997 Act violated TRIPS. South Africa 
also came under pressure from the U.S. Government to 
repeal the Act, and was placed on a Watch List under the 
Section 301 Special Report of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), pursuant to the Trade Act of 
1974 (Bond, 1999; Doctors Without Borders, 2001; 
Lucyk, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the South African Government refused 
to yield to these pressures, and with the support of civil 
society groups, the pharmaceutical companies and the 
U.S. Government eventually capitulated (Hong, 2000; 
Mellino, 2010). But this was only after about 400,000 
South Africans had reportedly succumbed to HIV/AIDS 
(Kasper, 2001). And despite the U.S. retreat and the 
withdrawal of the law suit by the pharmaceutical 
companies, South Africa was required, as part of the deal 
that resolved the stalemate, to guarantee that it would 





1997 legislation was never implemented (Lucyk, 2006; 
Mellino, 2010). This event vividly demonstrates how 
pharmaceutical patents deny people in sub-Saharan 
Africa access to essential medicines.  
Profit maximisation is not the end of pharmaceutical 
patents. Rather, patents serve only as a means to an 
end; that end being to enrich society with medicines that 
are essential to its survival. Failing this, the profits reaped 
by pharmaceutical companies are unjustifiable. And in 
line with the Lockean proviso, the patents granted are 
illegitimate, and, as seen in this case, may be 
undermined, even under TRIPS.  
 
 
The Doha declaration 
 
Provisions on parallel importation (Article 6) and 
compulsory licensing (Article 31) are enshrined in TRIPS. 
Regrettably, some members failed to interpret and imple-
ment TRIPS in a manner supportive of public health. 
They tended to prioritize the protection of IPRs, to the 
neglect of health concerns, especially of developing 
countries, including sub-Saharan Africa (Reichman, 
2009; Mellino, 2010). The South African case is one 
example of how developed countries and pharmaceutical 
companies exert undue pressure on weaker countries 
that seek to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities in order to meet 
their healthcare requirements. 
That unsatisfactory state of affairs was strongly 
criticized by civil society groups, notably Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam, which clamoured for the 
supremacy of the human right of access to essential 
medicines over IPRs. This and other pressures ultimately 
led to the Doha (WTO) Ministerial Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of November 14, 
2001 (Sun, 2004). Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration 
reiterates Members’ right to grant compulsory licences, 
as well as the right to determine the grounds for doing so. 
Paragraph 5(c) emphasizes on members’ right to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency, or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, such as, but not 
limited to HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB. In a nutshell, the 
Doha declaration sought to assure that TRIPS was res-
ponsive to the healthcare needs of developing countries 
and to highlight how they could deploy its flexibilities 
toward that end (Sun, 2004). But despite that Declaration, 
uncertainties remained, especially with regard to 
developing countries that lack the manufacturing capacity 
needed to exploit the right to grant compulsory licences. 
Even if a developing country granted such a licence, 
there was no domestic manufacturing capacity to put it 
into use. And 31(f) of TRIPS limits the supply of 
medicines produced under a compulsory licence predo-
minantly to the domestic market of the WTO member 
granting the licence. In other words, the medicines must 
be produced within the territory of the member granting 
the compulsory licence. This qualification posed further 





Africa, and in other similarly placed developing countries, 
where the infrastructure needed to support the 
manufacturing process is non-existent (Kohr, 2002; 
Abbott, 2005; Reichman, 2009; Mellino,  2010). 
Although, members with large markets and appropriate 
technological capacity, such as Brazil, India, and China 
could issue compulsory licences to manufacture patented 
medicines in response to domestic healthcare 
requirements, they could not supply medicines produced 
under such a license to other developing member 
countries, which lack productive capacity. This is 
because supply must be predominantly to their domestic 
markets (Correa, 2002). Again, even if a sub-Saharan 
African country lacking manufacturing facilities chose to 
issue a compulsory licence say to Brazil or India, it would 
still be trapped by the Article 31(f) dilemma because 
either country could only supply the medicines produced 
under that licence predominantly to its domestic market 
(Mellino, 2010). Before 2005, when they became obliged 
to implement TRIPS, developing countries, such as India, 
which did not grant pharmaceutical patents, could 
produce cheap generic versions of patented medicines 
for their domestic markets and for other developing coun-
tries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
that alternative ceased to be available after 2005 
(Scherer and Watal, 2002; Shashikant, 2005). 
 
 
Post Doha - The August 2003 decision  
 
The difficulties explained above made the problem 
associated with the Article 31(f) provision more critical. 
Consequently, the matter was referred back to the TRIPS 
Council for further consideration. That led to the 
clarification provided in the August 30, 2003 decision. 
That decision provides that under certain conditions, the 
requirement to supply predominantly to the domestic 
market contained in Article 31(f) may be waived. Under 
paragraph 2 of the decision, a member desirous of 
importing pharmaceutical products must notify the TRIPS 
council, stating the names and intended quantities of the 
products. It must also confirm, if the products are 
patented in its territory, and that it has issued, or intends 
to issue a compulsory licence under TRIPS Article 31. 
Prospective importing Members, not being LDCs must, in 
addition, confirm that they lack sufficient manufacturing 
capacity. The exporting Member can only manufacture 
quantities necessary to meet the needs of the importing 
Member as notified to the TRIPS council. And it must 
ship all the quantities so manufactured to that importing 
member. 
Also, the products must be clearly labeled or marked, 
and if possible, packaged in such a manner as to identify 
them as having been produced under the system 
provided for in this decision. The exporting member must 
pay adequate compensation to the patent holder. The 
TRIPS council will then grant a waiver of the Article 31(f)  




requirement to the exporting member (Weber and Mills, 
2010; Mellino, 2010). The 2003 decision was subse-
quently adopted by the TRIPS general council as an 
amendment to TRIPS in December, 2005. It would be 
integrated into TRIPS after ratification by two-thirds of 
WTO members (Mellino, 2010). 
The EU and several other members such as Canada, 
Switzerland, Norway, India and China have implemented 
the 2003 decision through domestic legislation (Weber 
and Mills, 2010). But, despite this, as of September 2008, 
only Canada had used the August 2003 system to supply 
essential generic ARV medicines to Rwanda (Raja, 2010; 
Weber and Mills, 2010). And less than twelve members 
had used it to manufacture essential medicines for their 
domestic use (Weber and Mills, 2010). This situation has 
been attributed to the complexities associated with the 
practical operation of the system under the August 2003 
decision. This is exemplified by the Canada’s Access to 
Medicines Regime (CAMR). The CAMR specifies the 
conditions that prospective importing LDCs must meet. 
Some of the problems associated with the 2003 system, 
as well as the CAMR, include confusing legal 
technicalities, the failure of LDCS to understand how to 
go about the process of obtaining an import licence, the 
costs and time involved in trying to get a voluntary 
licence, or to renew a compulsory one (Apotex, 2009; 
Cohen-Kohler et al., 2006; Goodwin, 2008). 
The more significant factor, however, is the general 
reluctance of both importing and exporting members to 
utilize the system due to fears of reprisals from strategic 
trading partners and pharmaceutical companies (Weber 
and Mills, 2010). The office of the USTR and international 
pharmaceutical companies has continued to pressurize 
and dissuade members from invoking compulsory 
licences. For example, Abbott laboratories held back the 
launching of several new medicines in Thailand when the 
latter invoked a compulsory licence to produce an 
HIV/AIDS medicine that was under Abbott’s patent 
(Wong-Anan, 2008). 
The U.S. Government also included Thailand on its 
Watch List under the Special Section 301 Report of the 
USTR because it issued compulsory licenses for several 
medicines used to treat cancer and HIV/AIDS (Evans, 
2008; Weber and Mills, 2010). Being named on the 
“Watch List” exposes a country to U.S. trade sanctions. 
This discourages members from exploiting the TRIPS 
flexibilities (Evans, 2008; Weber and Mills, 2010). This is 
so even though the U.S. uses the compulsory licence 
flexibility to meet its own healthcare needs. In 2001, it 
issued a compulsory license for the production of 
ciprofloxacin, which was under Bayer’s patent, as a pro-
tective measure against Anthrax attack (Love, 2005; 
Mellino, 2010). 
The U.S. also pressurizes developing countries 
through Free trade agreements (FTAs) to adopt “TRIPS-
plus” standards. That means standards that are higher 
than  the   TRIPS   minimum  IP  protection  requirements  




(Smith et al., 2009). This ignores the fact that TRIPS 
Article 1 provides that members are under no such 
obligation. These pressures, and the practical problems 
associated with TRIPS hinder access to cheap and 
affordable medicines. The view, therefore, that TRIPS 
and pharmaceutical patents do not hinder access to 
essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa, especially 
given the in-built flexibilities, remains far-fetched. As can 
be seen, the exploitation of those flexibilities has proven 
to be problematic, both as a practical matter, and in 
strategic terms. 
Returning to Richard Sykes’ earlier argument that 
pharmaceutical patents will enable developing countries 
with the relevant technological capacity to establish their 
own pharmaceutical industry that is not entirely convince-
ing. Although, that argument may hold true for specific 
developing countries such as Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa, most developing countries, especially those 
in sub-Saharan Africa, lack the needed technological 
expertise, and financial resources to set up their own 
pharmaceutical industry. Thus, patent protection is un-
likely to be of any significant benefit to them in this regard 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002).  
Another way in which TRIPS impedes access to 
essential medicines in sub Saharan Africa lies in the 
expansion of patent lifespan for pharmaceuticals to 
twenty years. This prolongation favours pharmaceutical 
companies, which can continue to charge monopoly 
prices (Geradin et al., 2008). At the same time, it delays 
the production of cheap off-patent equivalents on which 
poor people in sub Saharan Africa depend (Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 2002). 
Access to essential medicines depends partly on the 
ability of people in sub-Saharan Africa to pay for them 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002; Bird and Cahoy, 2008). In some developing coun-
tries that have strong pharmaceutical industries, prices 
rose with the introduction of patents (Fink, 2000; Watal, 
2002). Unlike developed countries where governments or 
insurance companies bear a large proportion of the cost 
of treatment, people in sub-Saharan Africa are indivi-
dually responsible for their own treatment, given limited 
public healthcare services caused by scarce resources 
(Mellino, 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 1% 
of global health expenditure, and despite being home to 
approximately 67% of worldwide HIV/AIDS patients 
(AVERT, 2008), only one-third of those in need of ARVs 
are able to access them (Palitza, 2009). Moreover, health 
insurance schemes are hardly effective in sub-Saharan 
Africa because most people are engaged in the informal 
sector (Shah, 2009). Only about 10.3% of the people 
there are covered by health insurance, and individual 
spending accounts for 80% of total healthcare expen-
ditures in some countries (International Intellectual 
Property Institute, 2000). 





charge prices that do not take account of differences in 
purchasing power. The result is that often, poor consu-
mers, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, pay prices 
that are higher than those paid by consumers in 
developed countries, such as the U.S (Scherer and 
Watal, 2002). Although the threat of compulsory licensing 
could promote competition, and force prices to fall, this 
option is bedevilled by numerous obstacles, including, as 
explained, international pressures, and sub-Saharan 
Africa’s generally weak finances and manufacturing 
capacity (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
Report, 2002; Dutfield, 2008). 
Even if there were a local manufacturer with the 
relevant technical expertise and finances to produce a 
patented medicine under compulsory licensing, the small 
markets in sub-Saharan Africa do not offer the critical 
mass essential to profit maximisation at reduced prices 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002). Added to these challenges are the difficulties 
involved in the replication of original medicines, and the 
problems of lengthy lead times and delays in the 
production and supply of medicines to those in urgent 
need of them (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights Report, 2002). 
Finally, pharmaceutical patents restrict access to 
essential medicines by encouraging biopiracy in 
biologically-rich developing countries, including those in 
sub-Saharan Africa. They enable pharmaceutical compa-
nies to pirate medicinal plants and other genetic materials 
from resource-rich developing countries, which are 
subsequently used to produce patented medicines. While 
patented medicines are expensive and unaffordable to 
the indigenous communities that own the biological 
resources used in producing them, biopiracy further 
deprives them of the traditional medicines that serve as 
alternative means of meeting their healthcare 
requirements. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was 
adopted in 1992, as well as the Nagoya Protocol in 2010, 
to tackle the problem of biopiracy. These instruments aim 
to ensure that access to the genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge of indigenous communities, mostly 
in developing countries, is based on the prior informed 
consent of those communities. They also seek to 
promote the equitable sharing of biomedical research 
benefits, including access to treatment, with those 
communities. Yet, some key WTO members, mainly 
developed countries, have opposed both instruments on 
the grounds that they undermine IPRs, and are, 
therefore, TRIPS-incompatible. Others that have not 
expressed direct objections to the instruments pay only 
lip service to them. 
In April 2011, WHO members adopted an agreement 
on the sharing of influenza viruses as a flu pandemic 
response measure. But the preceding negotiations were, 
once again, overshadowed by disagreements over IPRs. 





samples, part of their genetic resources, to the WTO, 
which, in turn, made them available to developed 
countries and their pharmacetical companies. But while 
developing countries continued to suffer high casualties 
from the H5N1 virus, the pharmaceutical companies were 
busy patenting the viruses and the vaccines made from 
them, which were sold at costs unaffordable to 
developing countries (IP Watch, 2011). That led to 
protestations from developing countries. In the final 
agreement that was reached recently, pharmaceutical 
companies offered to pay 50% of the costs of adminis-
tering the global influenza monitoring scheme and to 
supply 10% of vaccines and ARVs to developing coun-
tries. It is not yet clear how effectively these promises 
would be fulfilled. Concerns have also been expressed 
that these commitments are far too insignificant in 
meeting the needs of developing countries that account 
for 80% of the global population (Third World Network, 
2011). 
As has been commented, the real objective of TRIPS 
may be to protect IPRs, and numerous practical and 
other difficulties may, indeed, be associated with that 
agreement. Still, Sub-Saharan African countries should 
remember that TRIPS allows them the flexibility to 
formulate or modify their domestic IP legislation, and to 
take measures necessary to protect public health. Article 
7, which sets out the TRIPS objectives, adds that the 
protection and enforcement of IPRs should promote the 
mutual benefit of producers and users of IP, and in a 
manner that enhances social and economic welfare. This 
provision aims to balance rights and responsibilities, and 
clearly acknowledges that IP protection is only a means 
to an end, not an end in itself (International Intellectual 
Property Research Institute, 2000). 
Article 8(1) also provides that in making their domestic 
laws, members may take measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition and promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, so long as those measures 
are TRIPS-compliant. Under Article 8(2), members have 
the right to apply their domestic legislation to prevent 
IPRs from being exercised in ways that conflict with their 
healthcare requirements (Correa, 2002; Weber and Mills, 
2010). These provisions further envisage striking a 
balance between IP protection and the wider societal 
interest (International Intellectual Property Research 
Institute, 2000). Moreover, under Article 73, members are 
free to adopt any measure they consider necessary for 
the protection of their essential security interests, or in 
response to other emergency. In these instances, 
members can even take actions that undermine TRIPS 
(International Intellectual Property Research Institute, 
2000). 
Also, paragraph 5(c) of the Doha declaration grants 
Members the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency. These rights are relevant to the use  of  compul- 




sory licences, or the adoption of other measures under 
Article 8(1) (Corea, 2002). Sub-Saharan African countries 
should retain the right to issue compulsory licences and 
to admit parallel imports in their domestic legislation. 
Parallel importation would enable them to buy patented 
medicines, without the patent holder’s approval or 
interference, from a market which offers a price that is 
lower than the one charged by the patent holder. This is 
based on the “exhaustion” principle, which means that 
having once put the goods on the market; the patent 
holder can no longer interfere with their movement 
(Junaid, 2006; Mellino, 2010). 
In addition, Article 6 of TRIPS, which was reaffirmed in 
paragraph 5(c) of the Doha declaration, allows members 
to independently determine the point at which the 
exhaustion of the patent holder’s right occurs 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002; Correa, 2002). Under Article 6, matters relating to 
the exhaustion of IPRs are not subject to the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism. No compliant can, for 
example, be brought against a member that adopts an 
international exhaustion principle in its domestic patent 
law, and permits the parallel importation of medicines 
(International Intellectual Property Institute, 2000). 
Pursuant to Article 30, sub-Saharan African countries 
can derogate from exclusive patent rights granted under 
Article 28 insofar as this does not unreasonably interfere 
with the normal exploitation of the patent and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
patent holder. In EC v Canada (2000), the WTO dispute 
settlement panel agreed that a member could rely on the 
Article 30 provision (otherwise called the “Bolar” 
exception) to authorize the production of patented 
medicines for the purposes of pre-marketing testing. 
However, the exception did not extend to production for 
commercial use or stockpiling. 
In that case, the dispute settlement panel found that 
the aspect of Canada’s law, which allowed production for 
pre-marketing testing, was consistent with Article 30, but 
that aspect, which allowed for stockpiling amounted to a 
violation. Worthy of note is the Panel’s observation that 
while the limits and objectives in Articles 7 and 8(1) need 
be borne in mind, the exceptions to patent rights 
permitted in Article 30 under certain circumstances, are 
pointers to the malleability of the exclusivity of patent 
rights provided under Article 28. The Article 30 exception 
to the rights of patent holders allows producers of 
generics to carry out experimental tests while a patent is 
still valid, in order to be able to apply for and obtain 
necessary regulatory approvals. They can then produce 
and sell the generic medicines immediately the patent 
expires, without undue delay (International Intellectual 
Property Institute, 2000). 
Retaining the rights of compulsory licensing and paral-
lel importation will also be useful in pursuing systematic 
differential pricing by pressurizing pharmaceutical 
companies to cooperate with  such  a  scheme.  But  sub- 




Saharan African governments need to ensure that 
medicines obtained under differential pricing schemes do 
not slip back onto the higher priced markets of developed 
countries (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
Report, 2002). It should be noted, however, that in order 
to utilise the TRIPS flexibilities, sub-Saharan African 
countries must incorporate the relevant provisions, for 
example, on compulsory licensing, parallel importation, in 
their domestic laws. This is because the flexibilities do 
not automatically become part of Members’ domestic 
laws. Therefore, in the absence of such incorporation, a 
Member may not be able to protect itself against legal 
challenges (Correa, 2002). 
Governments in sub-Saharan Africa should equally 
give careful consideration to the compensation payable to 
the patent holder under Article 31 (g) when invoking a 
compulsory licence. The compensation rate should be 
compatible with the primary goal of providing universal 
access to cheap medicines (Correa, 2002; Love, 2005). 
Sub-Saharan African countries that qualify as LDCs 
should recognise that following the Doha Declaration, 
they can enjoy an extension of the transitional period 
granted under Article 66.1 of TRIPS. And although 
Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration relates to the 
extension of the transitional period specifically for 
pharmaceutical patents, the declaration also gives them 
the right to claim extensions for other non-pharmaceutical 
matters under Article 66.1 (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Report, 2002; Correa, 2002). In addition, 
they can claim more extensions even for pharmaceutical 
patents after the expiry of the initial extension in 2016 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002; Correa, 2002). 
It is particularly astonishing that some LDCs had gone 
ahead to implement TRIPS in their domestic laws, even 
before the expiration of the transitional period they were 
granted (International Intellectual Property Institute, 
2000). Sub-Saharan African LDCs that have already 
granted patents for pharmaceutical products should 
amend their domestic laws and withdraw such patents, 
since they are not required to do so until at least, 2016 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Report, 
2002; Correa, 2002). 
By tailoring their IP systems to meet their domestic 
needs, sub-Saharan African countries will not be doing 
anything new under the sun. In the 19th century, 
developed countries similarly used their IP systems to 
advance their national interests. For example, the U.S., 
then a net consumer of IP, granted patent rights only to 
its citizens and residents, and when patents were granted 
to foreigners, they were charged about ten times the 
domestic fee (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
Report, 2002). Some European countries, such as 
Switzerland, were also reluctant to grant patents so that their 
citizens could continue to use the inventions of foreign 
competitors (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
Report, 2002). 





and South Korea, also applied only weak IP protection 
standards that suited their domestic conditions and levels 
of development (Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights Report, 2002). 
Sub-Saharan African countries should also endeavor 
to reconcile their TRIPS commitments with the rights 
granted under other international instruments, for 
example, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), which recognizes the right to 
medical care. Stricter standards for granting patents 
should be imposed and stringent measures taken to curb 
biopiracy incidents. In this regard, they should 
incorporate the provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol into their domestic laws, and try to utilize them 
as effectively as possible. They should also seek to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the implementation of 
both instruments internationally, using the platform of the 
Conference of the Parties acting as a Meeting of the 
Parties (COP/MOP). But in addition to these measures, 
sub-Saharan African countries must try to improve their 
healthcare systems, provide necessary infrastructure and 
review current tariff and taxation policies. 
Of course, the cooperation of developed countries is 
required. They should amend their domestic laws in order 
to facilitate the waiver of the Article 31(f) provision, and 
be able to supply essential medicines to sub-Saharan 
Africa (Correa, 2002).
 
Based on the lessons learnt from 
the Canadian CAMR, the formulation of domestic laws 
should not be so cumbersome as to discourage the 
meaningful use of the system provided for in the August 
2003 decision.  It is equally important that, in light of 
paragraph 4 of the Doha declaration, TRIPS should not 
only be interpreted, but also implemented consistently 
with the right of other members, particularly those in sub-
Saharan Africa, to safeguard public health (Correa, 
2002). 
Therefore, developed countries should desist from 
actions likely to undermine the exercise of this right, for 
example, by threatening retaliatory trade measures, or 
refusing to take steps under the August 2003 decision to 
supply essential medicines to sub-Saharan African 
countries that lack manufacturing capacity (Correa, 
2002). Since TRIPS grants members certain flexibilities, 
which have been recognised by the Doha declaration and 
the August 2003 decision, attempts to discourage their 
use, as was the case in South Africa, are inimical to the 
intent and purposes of TRIPS. This is all the more so, 
given the glaring public health crisis facing sub-Saharan 
African countries (Correa, 2002). 
In light of their limited financial resources, sub-Saharan 
Africa needs increased international funding, in order to 
acquire essential medicines, provide adequate healthcare 
infrastructure and improve their overall healthcare ser-
vices. Such assistance is also necessary to enable them 
meet the costs of instituting and maintaining optimal IP 
protection systems. All this calls for strong commitments, 
on the part of developed countries and the pharma-





global actors, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the International Drug 
Purchase Facility (UNITAID), the Global Forum for Health 
Research, Oxfam, MSF, and WHO. Verbal declaration of 
support must be translated into concrete action. But 
whatever assistance that is provided should be with a 
sense of public support, free of any form of obligation, or 
ideological cleavages. Increased media campaign, 
public-private collaboration in funding, as well as in 
research specifically focused on diseases prevalent in 
sub-Saharan Africa should be encouraged. This is with 
the ultimate objective of providing universal access to 
essential medicines in sub-Saharan Africa. As UNAIDS 
(2010) correctly observes, TRIPS does not, and should 
not prevent members from taking measures necessary to 





It is clear from this discussion that several non-patent 
factors affect access to essential medicines in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, despite that, pharmaceutical 
patents also have negative impacts on access to essen-
tial medicines. And, attempts to use the TRIPS flexibilities 
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